

November 14, 2007

Mr. Eric Gillies, Project Manager California State Lands Commission 100 Howe Ave., Suite 100-South Sacramento, CA 95825

Re:

Comments on the Draft EIR for the Venoco PRC 421 Re-commissioning Project SCH No. 2005061013; CSLC EIR No. 732

Dear Eric:

Venoco, Inc. has reviewed the above-referenced Draft EIR prepared by AMEC Earth & Environmental, Inc. and has numerous comments that warrant substantial revision to the document. General comments are provided below while specific comments are presented in the attached table. In addition, comments pertaining to Venoco's legal position with respect to the project have been submitted by Hollister & Brace under separate cover.

## **General Comments**

- (1) <u>Venoco's Vested Right</u> The DEIR should include a discussion on Venoco's vested right to resume SL 421 operations. Such explanation is critical to establish the regulatory context in which the California State Lands Commission's (CSLC) decision will be made. The California Coastal Commission (CCC), in its July 5, 2007 comment letter to CSLC on the Notice of Preparation, recognizes the importance of this issue and also requested that the DEIR address this matter.
- (2) <u>Baseline</u> Venoco believes the project baseline should be a resumption of SL 421 production in its historic configuration (see letter from Hollister & Brace). However, if CSLC contends that the appropriate baseline is as described in the DEIR, then the changes described in the attached table should be made.
- (3) <u>No Project Alternative</u> The No Project Alternative accurately describes the natural repressurization of the reservoir and indicates that this alternative would identify potential impacts if the proposed Project were not implemented, including assessing whether there are any potential effects to the coastal environments as a possible result of repressurization. However, the subsequent resource analyses fail to follow through with a comparison of impacts of the proposed Project to that of the No Project Alternative, including its risks. The document should be modified to make these important comparisons.
- (4) <u>EMT / Barge Safety Analysis</u> The DEIR gives a false and grossly overstated perception of risk with respect to EMT and barge operations. Rather than focusing on the potential impacts associated with an increase of barge trips up to a maximum of 5 per year under the maximum projected production scenario for SL 421, the DEIR appears to adopt the conclusions of the Ellwood Marine Terminal (EMT) DEIR where barging operations were evaluated under the

current maximum permitted limits of the operations. This scenario is irrelevant to the proposed Project and any reference to the probability or magnitude of impacts associated with this scenario should be deleted from the PRC 421 Re-commissioning Project DEIR as it significantly and incorrectly overstates the risks and potential impacts of the PRC 421 Project.

- (5) <u>Maximum Daily Production</u> The DEIR should be corrected to clarify that the maximum daily production from PRC 421 could be as high as 1000 bpd, however the average production for the first year is anticipated to be 700 bpd.
- (6) <u>EMT EIR Mitigation</u> Incorporation of all the mitigation measures from the EMT Lease Extension EIR into the Proposed project is inappropriate as the two projects have significantly different scopes and several mitigation do not apply (see specific comments).
- (7) No Project Alternative with Pressure Testing The impacts analysis for this alternative should compare risks associated with operation of the above-ground 2" oil flow line to Line 96 at daily rates sufficient to relieve the reservoir pressure over the one-year testing period (which could exceed the proposed project maximum daily rate) vs. operation of the proposed double-walled buried pipeline over the twelve-year operating life. EMT and barge loading risks will be the same or greater in the first year under the No Project with Pressure Testing Alternative. Overall, the risks associated with this scenario are likely to be considerably higher over the 12-month period of testing than the Proposed Project in the first year of operation when production would be at its peak (i.e., worst case year in terms of risk). These risks should be quantified and represented as risk curves for comparative purposes. The risk curves will cross at some point, however, the risks associated with the Proposed Project will diminish substantially over time as 421 production declines and the number of additional barge loads decreases.
- (8) <u>Alternatives Analyses</u> The DEIR is not consistent in its discussion of applicable mitigation measures for the various alternatives. For many resource categories, it is unclear what mitigation measures would apply under the alternatives. For instance, in the sections on Safety, Air Quality, Land Use, and Aesthetics, the DEIR does not clearly state what specific mitigation measures would be applied to the No Project Alternative with Pressure Testing or Onshore Oil Separation at the EOF. Yet, the Land Use section suggests that all mitigation identified for the proposed Project in *all* resource areas would apply. The application of all mitigation measures to the short-duration (6 to 12 month) No Project Alternative with Pressure Testing is clearly not appropriate.

We appreciate your consideration of our comments and would be happy to meet with you to discuss them as needed.

Sincerely,

Stephen A. Greig

Government Relations& Regulatory Manager

## Venoco, Inc. Comments on the DRAFT EIR for the Venoco PRC 421 Re-commissioning Project

Page/Location	Comment
Executive Sumr	
	Revisions made in response to comments on specific sections of the document should also be reflected in the revised Executive Summary.
Page ES-1	Venoco is no longer a privately held company, but is publicly traded. Please correct throughout the document.
Page ES-7, Line 14	The No Project with Pressure Testing Alternative describes full decommissioning after the completion of pressure testing to include removal of the access road in addition to the facilities. Preservation of the road may prove useful to the City or other organizations that have expressed interest, although maintenance would clearly no longer be Venoco's responsibility.
Page ES-11, Lines 32, 33	Please correct to read "Three tanks (the two three existing crude oil tanks and the oily water tank),"
Page ES-46	The DEIR concludes that Pipeline Transportation to LFC is the environmentally preferable transportation option, but fails to state that this option is not economically feasible unless the Ellwood Full Field Development Project is approved. This reality should be made clear in the document.
Introduction	
Page 1-1	A pivotal aspect to the consideration of PRC 421 Re-commissioning is a legal analysis of Venoco's vested right to return the facilities to production. This analysis is currently missing from the document. We suggest such an analysis be included in the beginning of the document.
Page 1-7, Figure 1-2	Please correct typo in the EMT description, changing "curse" to "crude" oil.
Page 1-9, Lines 1-9	This paragraph should be removed as there is no basis for discussing clean-up at the EMT in this document. Site conditions at the EMT have no relevance to this project.
Page 1-11, Footnote 2	This footnote indicates that a revised DP may be required for Line 96 throughput increase. Similar references are made elsewhere in the document as though 421 production is a new source of oil to Line 96 (page 2-11). The DEIR should acknowledge that Line 96 has historically been used to transmit SL 421 oil to the EMT.
	Therefore, it should not be considered a new production source and would not require a DP revision.
<b>Project Descript</b>	tion
Page 2-1, Line 16	The statement that oil development "occurred from the 1930s to the 1950s" should be expanded, to say " the late 1920s to the 1990s". 421-1 was completed in November 1929, and 421-2 was completed in April 1930, while activity in the area was booming. The facilities continued to be operated and developed, with active developmental activities occurring in the Ellwood area well into the 1990s.
Page 2-4, Line 29	Please change the word "thought" to "found to be" in reference to the Vaqueros and the Ellwood Field.
Page 2-6, Line 7	Please correct the sentence to read "other monitoring of abandoned offshore wells has been conducted."
Page 2-11, Table 2-1, Section "Barge Jovalan"	Instead of "However, under the EMT Lease Renewal Project, barge calls would gradually increase to a maximum of 88 annual barge trips" please insert: "However, under the EMT Lease Renewal Project, barge calls could gradually increase to a maximum of 88 annual barge trips." Please explain that the trips would only increase if the production from Holly increases.

Page/Location	Comment
Page 2-12,	The last sentence should be added to as follows: "[] and transported to refineries via
Last row of	Barge Jovalan, while the EMT is continuing its operation, or by an alternative means of
Table 2-1	oil transportation if the EMT lease ends and the terminal decommissioned." This entry
Table 2	should also include the fact that PRC 421 production would increase barge Jovalan
	loads by a maximum of 5 per year under peak production (anticipated year 1) and
1	reduce down to one additional load per year in the later years of 421 operation.
Page 2-16,	Step 7 of the Construction Procedures calls for the insertion of 2" steel coiled flowline
Lines 1, 2	inside the 6" pipeline. Venoco's project description states that we also want option to
Linos 1, 2	utilize non-metallic piping materials (e.g., fiberglass). The type of material will be
	determined during the detailed engineering phase. This procedure in the DEIR should
	be modified accordingly.
Geological Res	
Page 4-23,	The text states that the proposed project design may be inadequate to sustain seismic
Line 33	loading. The proposed project will be designed to meet all applicable regulations,
	including seismic loading requirements.
Page 4-26, MM	Last sentence should be modified as follows: "If saturation is apparent, the source of
Geo-2a	the water infiltration shall be evaluated and, if possible, diverted or removed."
Page 4-27, MM	Please modify the last sentence to read "The conclusions and recommendations shall
Geo-3a, Line	be incorporated into Project engineering design components for the pipeline, as
32	applicable, and submitted to the CSLC and SSRRC, as applicable, for review and
	approval.
Pages 4-32, -	The No Project Alternative with Pressure Testing impacts analysis should compare
33	risks associated with operation of the above-ground 2" oil flow line to Line 96 at daily rates sufficient to relieve the reservoir pressure over the one-year testing period (which
	could exceed the proposed project maximum daily rate) vs. operation of the proposed
	double-walled buried pipeline over the twelve-year operating life. EMT and barge
	loading risks will be the same or greater in the first year under the No Project with
	Pressure Testing Alternative. Overall, the risks associated with this scenario are likely
/	to be considerably higher over the 12-month period of testing than the Proposed
	Project in the first year of operation when production would be at its peak (i.e., worst
	case year in terms of risk). These risks should be quantified and represented as risk
	curves for comparative purposes. The risk curves will cross at some point in time,
	however, the risks associated with the Proposed Project will diminish substantially over
	time as 421 production declines and the number of additional barge loads decreases.
Safety	
Page 4-38,	The sentence should be corrected to read, "The proposed Project would not require
Line 28	physical changes to the EMT, but would <del>create</del> reintroduce an additional source of
	crude oil throughput at the terminal." The EMT has historically accepted 421 oil in
	addition to production from Platform Holly and therefore should not be considered a
Demo 4 40	New source. What events could impact populations at Sandainer, Bacara, Deversity and Ellwood
Page 4-40, Lines 4-8	What events could impact populations at Sandpiper, Bacara, Devereux and Ellwood Schools, UCSB's West Campus and Married Student Housing, Francisco Torres
Lilies 4-0	Dormitories, and the Grove Condominiums? Such statements should be removed from
	the document as they grossly overstate potential impacts associated with the project.
Table 4.2-1, 2 <sup>nd</sup>	The statement "This facility is likely to have similar source and quantity of contaminated
Row, 2 <sup>nd</sup>	material as that found in PRC 421-1" is unsupported by evidence, is speculative and
Column	thus should be deleted. The operation on the two piers was different as they included
30.0	storage and separation equipment.
Table 4.2-1, 5 <sup>th</sup>	The sentence "The EOF control areas, integral to the Project, do not have notable
Row, 2 <sup>nd</sup>	conditions related to Safety" is confusing as to how it describes safety. This sentence
Column	carries no pertinent information and should be deleted and replaced with "The EOF
ļ	control areas are adequate with respect to Safety". The descriptive sentences after this
	sentence reflect the conditions.
<del></del>	

Dene/Leastion	Comment
Page/Location Table 4.2-1, 7 <sup>th</sup>	Sentence "The loading line is periodically exposed" is incorrect in that it makes it seem
Row, 2 <sup>nd</sup>	that the whole line is exposed. This sentence should be changed to "A short portion of
Column	the loading line within the beach is normally buried, but was exposed several times due
D 4.45	to severe winter weather."
Page 4-45,	The statement that the current condition of PRC 421-2 "is similar to that of PRC 421-1
Lines 4-5	prior to its partial collapse and emergency repair" is inaccurate and damaging.
Page 4-45,	This statement, as well as many others throughout the document, assumes the
Lines 7-9	presence of contamination within the caissons of 421-2. Unless there is evidence to
	substantiate this assumption, it should be deleted throughout.
Page 4-45,	This sentence should be clarified to read "Hazards and hazardous conditions
Lines 10-13	associated with the other Ellwood area oil production facilitieswould be affected by
	implementation of the proposed Project as it would increase total crude oil throughput
	at these facilities over baseline levels, as defined in the DEIR, but not over historic
	operating levels."
Page 4-45	There is no evidence that the modifications proposed with this project or any of the
	alternatives would cause a significant increase in existing risks associated with the
	current facilities. The DEIR should include some discussion to address this. For
	example, 5 barge trips (maximum increment) vs. a maximum of 65 per year (currently
	permitted); 1000 BOPD (anticipated daily maximum) vs. 5000 BOPD (current levels)
	incoming from Platform Holly to the EOF, through Line 96, and the EMT, etc.
Page 4-47,	Sentence "The estimated spill frequency from EMT loading lines" etc. It appears that
Lines 15-17	the percentage numbers should be for "probabilities of spills" and not for "spill
	frequencies" as currently stated. The statement as written could be misinterpreted in
L	the way that small ocean leaks occur 82 percent of the time. This should be corrected.
Page 4-47,	The 421 DEIR should not rely on the EMT EIR as it is an uncertified document and is
Lines 30-32	still being finalized. Any discussion of the EMT and barging operations should reflect
	the incremental barge loads attributable to 421 production (maximum of 5 the first
D 4 40	year).
Page 4-49,	The sentence "Crude oil can ignite, which could result in a crude oil fire" should be
Line 5	removed, as it does not pertain to the specific crude oil produced by the project
	facilities. The next sentence adequately describes the fire and explosion characteristics of the facilities oil as "virtually non-existent".
Page 4-50,	This statement should be revised to state that none of the drill scenarios included a
Line 21	release from 421, but a response from that facility would be similar.
	This section should state that annual SIMQAP audits are conducted at the EOF and
Page 4-56, Line 23	EMT.
	The statement " the design does not currently include a means of detecting low
Page 4-61, Lines 30 - 32	pressure" appears to be in error. According to the project description, the 2" flowline
Lines 30 - 32	will have both high and low pressure pilots.
Page 4-63,	This figure suggests that Line 96 spill volume would increase. This is not the case as
Figure 4.2-6	the pipeline operates in batch shipments and no change in pumping pressure is
Figure 4.2-0	proposed. Additionally, the pipeline has surveillance and control equipment in place to
	detect leaks and enable prompt shut-down of the pumps and valves if necessary. Spill
	volumes depend on two factors when a leak occurs: (1) pumping rates before the
	pumps are shutdown and pipeline leak isolated by closing the valves, and (2) volume of
	the isolated pipeline after shutdown draining out of the pipeline. The pipeline volume
	that could potentially drain from the pipeline would not change (the pipeline will have
	the same volume after the project). The pumping rates will not increase with the
	project, and will remain within the current range. Thus the project will not cause
	increased volumes of a potential oil leak. And thus, "Spill Volume: Increased
	(Unquantified)" should be replaced with "Spill Volume: No Change" on Figure 4.2-6.
Page 4-65,	That portion of the seawall shown in the photo is east of the PRC 421 piers and not
Photo and	Venoco's responsibility. Additionally, the conclusion drawn in the statement "The
impact	proposed Project would prolong the use of the existing causeway and supporting, aging
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discussion S-3  timber bulkhead, leading to possible ensision or collapse and the potential for release of hazardous materials and oil from within the causeway or Project-related pipelines' is speculative and assumes the lack of adequate structural maintenance during the life of the project. It assumes the prosence of contamination, which is unsubstantiated. The impact statement should be modified or stricken from the document. Venoco bears no responsibility or obligation to repair the seawall east of 421-2.  It is should be pointed out that the decision to forego a spill frequency estimate was because the probability brould prove to be so low. While the possibility for a spill exist, the probability is below a reasonable significance criterion of 1 x 10°.  Pages 4-88 to 4-70  The discussion about releases of oil and their mechanisms is confusing and lacks understanding of vast differences in distinct operations such as drilling, production and well workovers, the different equipment that is involved and different release and failure potentials associated with those distinct operations. This impact discussion should be negligibly low for the small operation such as the PRC 421.  Page 4-69, Line 10  Page 4-69, Line 10  Also, production and well workovers are different processes and potential for oil releases from these processes are very different. The statement that a release into a sub-surface area could make its way to the surface is very speculative. Also, as described in the comment for Page 4-70, line 4, the implication that a casing failure could lead to a bilowout may arous control equipment pieces would need to fail at the same time.  Page 4-69, Line 17  Page 4-69, Line 17  The California coastal zone is not known to experience hurricanes, especially such the revised. The author probably wanted to refer to the volume of the well cellar within the calsison.  The California coastal zone is not known to experience hurricanes, especially such assert sor wents as Hurricane Katrina, which is referred here	Daniell anation	Commant
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Regardless of how fluid is moved through the ESP - by the normal pumping action or		Regardless of how fluid is moved through the ESP - by the normal pumping action or

Page/Location	Comment
Page/Location	by "artesian" flow, a release would occur only if the piping at the surface developed a
	leak. During production operations with an ESP, there is always going to be oil in the casing next to the ESP.
Page 4-70,	Subsurface areas are below ground level by several hundreds to thousands of feet.
Line 18	Please correct the text.
Pages 4-71	The discussion states that the potential maximum volume of oil released is 12.5 barrels.
and 4-72	This amount of crude oil, given that it is mixed with water almost immediately, will not produce fire or explosion if released, even if it was exposed to an ignition source, which
	is highly unlikely given the location of the project facilities.
	Also, the oil produced at SL 421 is low sulfur with an H <sub>2</sub> S content of only 10 ppm. Therefore, a release of this oil will not produce toxic clouds that would cause injury or fatality.
	The oil spill response capabilities maintained by Venoco, and by the Venoco contractors are more than adequate to maintain and cleanup a release of 12.5 barrels. Venoco is prepared to review and add PRC 421 to its oil spill response plan and drills. Release of small amounts of oil that could be in the environment before spill response is initiated could result in temporary impacts on biological and water resources. However, it would not be a safety issue because of the low H <sub>2</sub> S content of the oil.
	Based on the above, Impact S-4 does not exceed the listed significance criteria, and thus it is not a safety impact, and should be classified as Class II, because it is a mitigable impact.
Page 4-75, Line 13	The reference to "leakage produced by the Project" should be rephrased as it sounds like there would be periodic small releases from the Project. This will not occur as all equipment will be pressure tested prior to being placed in service and will be routinely inspected and maintained throughout its operational life.
Page 4-76, MMS S-4b	Containment of the well cellar and caisson deck as described by this mitigation measure is impractical. We know of no "rubber" compound that will withstand salt/sun exposure; however, Stainless Steel drip pans could be used as a protective measure. The text should state that Venoco will work with CSLC technical staff to address this issue.
Page 4-76, Line 34	It appears there is an error in the description of the caisson deck – "The caisson deck shall be modified to include a "rubber type" liner inside the casing sealed against the easing caisson wall"
Page 4-77, MM S-4d	The timeframe given for the Fire Prevention Plan to be updated and formally circulated is unreasonably short given that Venoco cannot control how long it will take the agencies to review and provide comments. Please revise the last sentence to state: "The plan shall be revised and provided to the agencies for review prior to commencing operations, and the plan shall be formally updated and circulated within one month of commencing operations-receiving comments from said agencies."
Page 4-77, MM S-4d	The City of Goleta has neither the jurisdiction nor the expertise to add to the review provided by County Fire and CSLC. This mitigation measure should be revised to state that a copy of the Fire Prevention and Preparedness Plan would be provided to the City for informational purposes, but not for approval.
Page 4-77, MM S-4e	The testing pressure on the well casing should be at the maximum anticipated surface pressure based on the proposed operations in accordance with CSLC and DOGGR regulations. (3,000 psig is too high and could lead to other problems). The last line
	should be revised to note that repairs and improvements should be subject to review
	and approval of the agencies with expertise and jurisdiction in downhole matters  "CSLC, County of Santa Barbara, and the city of Goleta, and DOGGR."
Page 4-78,	It appears that the provided description of the leak detection and high and low pressure
Lines 15-19	switches should be for the new 2-inch pipeline that will contain oil and will be

Page/Location	Comment
	pressurized. The 6-inch pipeline would only serve as a protective "sleeve/conduit" and
	is not meant to have pressure switches. Please revise your description according to the Project Description.
Page 4-78, Line 16	The high and low-pressure sensing switches would be installed on the 2" line, not the 6" line. Please correct.
Page 4-80, MM S-5b	Measure MM S-5b is unnecessary, is not supported by pipeline failure probability calculations and should be deleted. Leaks in the 6-inch pipeline would not result in a release unless the 2-inch pipeline that contains oil would also break in the same place or close to the leak in the 6-inch pipeline ("sleeve"), which is very unlikely. The same arguments for the safe operation of the new pipeline apply as in insignificant Impact S-12 for the new pipeline to Las Flores Canyon. There are already redundant safety provisions built into the design, thus the proposed detection system on the 6-inch "sleeve" is unnecessary.
	The new 2-inch oil pipeline already has a low failure probability – it would be new, with modern anti-corrosion coating, equipped with pressure switches, and monitored by a SCADA system. The 6-inch "sleeve" will be coated, and has been tested. The 6-inch "sleeve" adds additional redundant protection to the new 2-inch line. The 6-inch "sleeve" reduces potential oil spills volumes in case 2-inch line breaks and serves as secondary containment, it adds additional structural support, and it protects the 2-inch line from contact with water or soil that could induce corrosion. Thus, the 6-inch sleeve adds redundant protection to the 2-inch line that already has low spill probability. The only scenario for an oil spill from the proposed line-in-line configuration is if both 2-inch and 6-inch pipelines would develop leaks or ruptures. The likelihood of breaking of both 2-inch and 6-inch pipelines is remote, and can occur if there is a third party excavation or an external event such as an earthquake.
	The chance of a third party compromising both the 6-inch "sleeve" and 2-inch oil pipeline is remote. The area where the pipeline is located would not experience third party construction activity as only Venoco and Sandpiper would have access to the site for such equipment. Any excavation activities within the Golf Course will be coordinated between Venoco and the Golf Course Management. Venoco security crews travel along the pipeline route on an ongoing daily basis and would immediately detect any trenching preparations being conducted by a third party. Any detection of unknown trenching preparations would be reported to Venoco, and investigated.
Page 4-80, Impact S-6, Lines 18-22	The impact conclusion in S-6, that the proposed Project would increase the potential for a release of oil or hazardous materials or of a fire or explosion, is incorrect and inconsistent with the conclusion drawn on the top of page 4-81, Lines 1-2 and 27. The EMT EIR concludes that despite increased throughput at the EMT, there is no increase in the number of expected spills from Line 96, as failure rate is a function of pipeline length rather than throughput. Please correct this section accordingly.
Page 4-82, Line 15	There appears to be an error in the description of operating pressures along the 2" line and Line 96. The design pressure for Line 96 is 285 psig, as noted, however the next part of the sentence needs to be corrected as it is unclear where the operating pressure of 415 psig came from.
Page 4-82, MM S-7	The Line 96 Overpressure Protection mitigation measure is redundant and unnecessary. There are already two levels of protection against overpressuring Line 96 by way of: (1) a high pressure pilot on the 2" line that would shut-in the well, if exceeded; and (2) a PSV on the separator that would limit pressure to 200 psig.
Page 4-83, Line 22, Page 4-85, Line 6, and throughout Section 4.3	The document references mitigation measure from the EMT EIR and incorporates them by reference. HM-1a calls for reducing crude oil hydrogen sulfide ( $\rm H_2S$ ) content before the crude oil leaves the EOF. As stated earlier in Section 4.2, PRC 421 crude is sweet, containing low sulfur and $\rm H_2S$ content. Therefore MM HM-1a does not apply to the proposed Project. Please modify all references to this mitigation measure accordingly.

Page/Location	Comment
Page 4-83, Lines 22-26; and Page 4-85, Lines 6-10	Incorporation of all the mitigation measures from the EMT Lease Extension EIR into the Proposed project is inappropriate as the two projects have significantly different scopes. Please remove incorporation by reference, as the previously developed measures have been developed for a project with a much larger scope, and are mostly inapplicable.
	The EMT EIR addresses an increase of barge operations by 63-64 loads per year (which is approx. 260% increase over the current situation). The Proposed project could increase barge loadings by 5 at most in the first year, with 4, 3 and 2 loadings per year increase in the following years. Thus, blanket incorporation of the EMT EIR measures is incorrect, and should be deleted.
Page 4-84, Impact S-9 discussion	The EMT Lease Extension EIR analyzed a full permitted capacity of the project facilities. However, PRC 421 would only result in a small increase in the project facilities oil throughput. The Project would increase barge loadings only by a maximum of 5 per year during peak production (i.e., the worst-case year). During other years there would be smaller increase in loadings. Therefore the discussion about 88 trips/loadings per year and any reference to the magnitude of impacts related to the 88 loadings/trips should be deleted from the discussion of all impacts throughout the EIR, because it significantly, unjustifiably and incorrectly overstates the PRC 421 project's scope and impacts.
	Also, Impact HM-2 in the EMT Lease Renewal EIR was an impact in the Hazardous Materials issue area, not Safety. This impact is already handled in Sections related to biology and water resources, however because a release of oil into the environment without causing injury or fatality to the public is not a safety impact, Impact S-9 should not be classified as significant in this section.
Page 4-84, Impact S-9	The Lines 23-25 state: "The additional throughput from PRC 421 would fall within this range, and at a maximum of 28 transfers per year (PRC 421 maximum throughput added to EMT existing conditions), would be nearly the same as existing conditions." Thus the conclusion confirms that the spill probabilities with the small increase in throughput from the project would be the same as the baseline. And yet the impact discussion reverts to the EMT EIR conclusion about a significant impact that was concluded for the increase in loadings from 23 to 88 (a significantly large increase than could occur from the proposed PRC-421 project).
	The Class of S-9 impact should be changed to <i>less than significant</i> , because the discussion of this impact leads to this conclusion, yet incorrectly reverts to a different project impact's conclusion.
Safety Section in General	As it is stated in Section 4.10, Transportation and Circulation: " barge Jovalan is in continuous use associated with other oil transportation projects and assignments [] Thus, if the barge would be making more trips to the EMT, it would be making fewer transportation assignments elsewhere that it currently performs." (DEIR page 4-338, lines 22 to 30, Offshore Traffic Impacts). This is a correct statement, and should be applied to the impact discussions in other sections of the DEIR, and not selectively applied only in the Offshore Traffic Impacts. This statement should be applied in Sections: 4.2 Safety, 4.3 Hazardous Materials, 4.6 Marine Biology, 4.4 Air Quality, and 4.5 Hydrology, Water Resources, and Water Quality, and impact discussions changed accordingly, to state that there is no increased oil spill probability or volumes from an increase of trips from the Proposed Project because other oil transportation trips will be occurring if the project does not go forward.
	The barge transports oil on various assignments up and down the Coast between Long Beach and San Francisco, with the same probability of spills with the same volume of spills that could potentially affect the same areas of the coastal zone and the same

Page/Location	Comment
	water and biology resources. This is baseline operation that occurs right now. If the
	barge would be involved in more trips associated with the proposed Project, it will be
	making fewer trips associated with other ports of call and assignments to transport oil.  Thus, the total annual miles related to the barge, tug, and assist vessel will stay the
	same whether or not the barge is employed more at the EMT or for other projects. The
	transportation section conclusion is that the marine traffic in the Santa Barbara Channel
	associated with the barge will stay the same with the proposed project. By the same
	logic, the project will not impact the spill probability or oil volumes that could be potentially released from the barge.
Page 4-86,	As stated in the comment above, the EMT full permitted scenario is subject of the EMT
Table 4.2-6	Lease Renewal EIR. The "EMT Permitted" failure rates and spill probabilities should be
	deleted from this table, as it is irrelevant to the proposed Project analysis yet it
	suggests a much higher spill probability than would be created by the proposed Project.
	Additionally, the overall probability should be calculated on a year-to-year basis to take
	into account the anticipated decline in production from PRC 421. Line 11 on Page 4-86
	notes this to be the case, but the probabilities presented in Table 4.2-6 for "With PRC
	421" are unjustly overstated. Since the potential for spills and anticipated impacts as a result of a spill are so strongly emphasized throughout every section of the document,
	correcting the probabilities is warranted.
Page 4-90, MM	This measure should be removed. Venoco believes we have a vested right to produce
S-11	oil from PRC 421. Should this project be denied, Venoco will pursue whatever options
	available to us in an attempt to secure those rights taking whatever time is necessary to
Page 4-91,	do so. The statement that Under the No Project Alternative with Pressure Testing, "there
Line 8	would be no production at PRC 421" is incorrect. Production would occur for up to one
	year. Therefore, all impacts should be assessed under this assumption.
Page 4-91,	The shorter-term risks associated with this alternative as compared to the proposed
Lines 19-21	project may affect the overall probability of an incident, but not the impact of an
e'	incident. In some respects, risks and the probability may actually be greater under the No Project with Pressure Testing Alternative than the proposed project over its lifetime
	(i.e., the oil transport line).
Page 4-102,	The statistics of the tanker truck transportation accidents take into consideration all
Impact S-14	trucks and all projects without considering mitigation measures that can be taken to
	reduce accidents. The statistics covers night transportation, long hours of work that
	produce fatigue in drivers, and all other conditions affecting accident-prone transportation.
	ii ai isportation.
	Mitigation Measures outlined in Section 4.10 Transportation and Circulation would
	mitigate and lower the accident rate from oil transportation (MM TR-5a and MM TR-5b).
	The frequency of an accident as estimated is already lower than one in the project lifetime. The measures will lower this frequency further. Thus, this impact should be
	classified as Class II, less than significant with mitigation.
Hazardous Mate	
Page 4-110,	The parenthetical statement suggests that the sludge tested in November 2000 was
Lines 24 - 27	subject to RCRA. This is not necessarily the case as there is an exemption in RCRA for
	petroleum waste. The waste would be subject to the CA Hazardous Waste Control
	Law as described on Page 4-116. Please correct.

Page/Location	Comment
Page 4-119,	MM HAZ-1b is unnecessary. The project will not cause additional contamination.
MM HAZ-1b	Accidents, should they occur, will be cleaned up at the time they occur and under the direction of the appropriate agencies. A Phase I ESA and subsequent sediment sampling will be performed when the facilities are abandoned and completely removed. In addition, several other mitigation measures, such as GEO-4a, GEO-3a, GEO-4d, S-2b will serve to evaluate the integrity and condition of the structures and mitigate the potential release of contaminants, if present.
D 4 440	
Page 4-119, MM HAZ-1c	The first sentence should be modified to read that soils in excavation areas will be sampled pursuant to SBC Fire Protection Division requirements if contamination is detected during construction work. See comment on MM HAZ-1b above.
Page 4-119, MM HAZ-1d	Construction areas (i.e., areas to be excavated) include upland areas along the pipeline right-of-way leading to the Line 96 tie-in. If contamination is detected during pipeline installation work, clean-up criteria should be consistent with those used for other upland projects elsewhere in the City of Goleta and County of Santa Barbara in accordance with SBC FPD and RWQCB regulations. The California Ocean Plan pertains to water quality objectives. Since the impact described is for potential soil contamination, the FPD regulations are applicable.
	No additional contamination will occur as a result of the Proposed Project. A Removal Action Plan will be prepared, as appropriate, at the time of facility abandonment.
Page 4-120, Impact HAZ-2, Line 30	This section assumes the presence of contaminated sediment within the caisson structures without substantiation. MM HAZ 1-b calls for a Phase 1 ESA to be performed to determine the presence of contamination. Prior to the completion of this study, it should not be assumed that contamination exists and could infiltrate out. Statements should be modified throughout this section (and elsewhere in the
	document) so that it does not read as a matter of fact (e.g., Lines 29-31: "The caisson walls are subject to weatheringand the potential exists for contaminated sediment contained within the caissons, <i>if any</i> , to infiltrate to the surrounding environment.")
Page 4-120, Lines 27-28	Please remove the statement, "However, the proposed Project will extend the use of the aging caisson structures" from this and other sections of the DEIR where it appears. This statement is untrue. The presence of the caisson structures is part of the baseline conditions, as defined in the DEIR, and will be present even without the proposed Project.
Page 4-121, Lines 11 - 13	This statement is written as a certainty and should be modified to read "Contaminated sediment may be contained within the caisson structure"
Air Quality	
Section 4.4	The DEIR assumes baseline conditions to be zero emissions from PRC 421 because operations have been suspended. As a result, the DEIR identifies several Air Quality impacts as Class 1. As stated in our general comments as well as those filed by Hollister & Brace on Venoco's behalf, we believe that the baseline description is not accurately defined. In this case, baseline conditions should reflect historic operations of PRC 421, including the associated air emissions.
Page 4-141, lines 7 to 17	Operational emissions impact of the EMT Lease extension is less than significant, and should be reclassified as Class III. This is because there will be no increase in peak day emissions beyond the fugitive emissions from the PRC 421-2 oil production system (which is 2.096 lbs/day from PRC 421).
	The daily emissions from the barge loading will not change with the proposed PRC 421 project, because these peak daily emissions already occur and are part of the baseline emissions. The EMT Lease Extension EIR analyzed operational impacts and the conclusion was that peak daily emissions do not change (Class II operational air quality impact). Annual operational emissions would change with the proposed PRC 421 project by emissions equivalent of 5 additional loadings and transportation of oil per year. However, annual increases in emissions are not in the significance criteria, and

Page/Location	Comment
	thus do not drive the significance of the operational emissions impact.
	To concur with the prior EIR that has been reviewed and finalized by the CSLC, operational air quality impact should be Class II. Please make the appropriate changes to the impact discussion to reflect this, and delete classification of this impact as unavoidable significant Class I impact.
	Another incorrect area is how the emissions from the barge are accounted for. In the Notes to Table 4.4-6, it is stated that emissions from the full trip to Long Beach or Shores Terminal have been accounted for in the air quality section. Only emissions in the Santa Barbara County APCD jurisdiction area should be compared to any significance criteria from this APCD. However, because of the above reasoning, and the EMT Lease Extension EIR conclusions about no increases of the peak day emissions, operational emissions from the proposed project are not influenced by the emissions from the barge loadings.
Table 4.4-6	Please explain what is the source of NOx emissions in the Row "Fugitive Emissions from Pier". There is no source of NOx emissions on the Pier or well system (the submersible pump is electric, and thus there will be no NOx emissions from this source. Please delete this number from this row. Please also make the appropriate changes in the "Total".
	Delete Rows "Barge Jovalan" and Tug Vessels" – see comment above with respect to the no increase of daily emissions from the barge loadings and transportation, and the statement in the paragraph below.
	Also, as it is stated in Section 4.10, Transportation and Circulation, barge Jovalan is in continuous use associated with other oil transportation projects and assignments. In all the trips the barge makes to transport oil, it is propelled by a tug and assisted by an assist boat, emissions also occur due to oil loadings and unloadings, the same as they occur with respect to the Ellwood Marine Terminal. If the barge would be involved in more trips associated with the current project, in the scheme of things, it will be making fewer trips associated with other projects and assignments, thus the total emissions related to the barge, tug, and oil loadings will stay the same. The transportation section conclusion is that the marine traffic associated with the barge will stay the same with the proposed project. By the same logic, emissions from the barge will stay the same.
Page 4-142, MM AQ-2a	The DEIR recommends, as an offset against fugitive emissions, that Venoco fund retrofitting tug and assist vessels with new engines. Venoco strongly opposes this as emissions associated with the tug and barge calls to the EMT are covered under existing permits. In fact, the barge permit allows for more service trips on an annual basis than currently occur. These vessels are already authorized to transport SL 421 production.
	The EIR is incorrect saying that "[] <u>fugitive emissions</u> [] are above the thresholds for NOx". Fugitive emissions are by definition ROC's. NOx cannot be fugitive in this system.
	In addition, (1) the peak day air emissions will not be above the CEQA thresholds of 55 lbs/day of NOx and ROC (the peak barge and tug emissions already occur and are part of the baseline). (2) Retrofitting the barge and tugs with new engines is not feasible because these vessels are owned by 3rd parties. (3) Retrofitting would require Venoco to unjustly carry the expense of the retrofit, although the barge and vessels are used by many other companies for oil transport. Thus, because peak daily emissions would be less than significant, and because it is not feasible to retrofit engines on the vessels, the mitigation measure MM AQ-2a part (1) should be deleted.

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Page/Location	Comment
Page 4-143, Lines 24 to 29	MM AQ-3 requires the barge tanks PSVs to be retrofitted with proximity switches. This measure is carried over from the Public Draft EIR for the EMT Lease Extension. There is no evidence of any potentially significant impact justifying this or any other measure on the barge Jovalan to reduce odors. This is because, as has been analyzed by the
	SBC APCD, it was found that only one of over 100 odor complaints in the EMT area was linked to the operations of the EMT and none was linked to the barge. The EMT EIR found that there was no obvious correlation between observed spikes of hydrogen sulfide concentrations in the air as measured at the nearby air quality monitoring station and barge loadings. Moreover, there is not logical connection between odor impacts
	and additional emission control devices on barge Jovalan. Because there is no evidence of impacts from odors from the asserted increased barge loadings, this mitigation measure is improper and should be deleted.
Page 4-149, lines 21, 22	For the same reasons as in the two comments above, please clarify that only annual emissions would change with respect to additional oil transportation and loading onto the barge.
Pages 4-150 and 4-151	Supply and demand of oil and petroleum products are driven by processes such as population growth, population migration and changes in technologies. Production of oil in California as compared to production of the same amount of oil elsewhere and delivery via a tanker to California would satisfy same demand, but the latter process would produce higher GHG emissions on the global scale. GHG emissions are a global issue and should be analyzed from the global perspective. It is proposed that GHG emissions of the project are compared to emissions that could be generated by producing same amount of oil elsewhere and delivering this amount of oil via a tanker with diesel engines to California refineries; and change the discussion accordingly.
	Also, as it is stated in Section 4.10, Transportation and Circulation, barge Jovalan is constantly making other trips (and it is propelled by the tug, and assisted by assist boats, and produces emissions associated with loading of oil) related to oil transportation. If the barge would be involved in more trips associated with the current project, in the scheme of things, it will be making fewer trips associated with other projects and assignments, thus the total emissions related to the barge, tug, and oil loadings will stay the same.
	The EIR concludes that the project would be responsible for emissions of CO <sub>2</sub> produced by the end users of the petroleum products that could potentially be manufactured from the oil produced by the PRC 421. This is incorrect, and a potentially very harmful conclusion. Demand for oil is not going to be increased by the PRC 421 production. Demand for oil is caused by other factors such as the population increases, etc. The demand for more oil will be filled from other source (most likely, imports from other countries), because Port of LA/Long Beach is an easy transportation destination for the import oil tankers.
	An oil producer can reduce emissions from the processes at its facility, and that can be regulated and enforced. However, it is unjust and harmful to hold the domestic producers accountable for the emissions produced by the end users of their products. $CO_2$ emissions will be produced by cars and trucks, as well as residential heaters whether or not oil is imported or produced domestically. However, domestic producers can be regulated, but the diesel driven tankers delivering oil and foreign oil producers cannot (at least by the California or local governments). The end users would still be supplied with gasoline, diesel and other fuels, and $CO_2$ emissions will be produced, without regard to a particular oil producer.
	We propose to compare the potential project CO <sub>2</sub> emissions only from the project production and oil transportation to the CO <sub>2</sub> emissions of production and transportation of oil that would be used and brought to the refineries in case the proposed project

Page/Location	Comment
. ago. no oat. o	does not occur (for instance emissions of tankers that bring oil from other countries
	should be compared to the emission from the project facilities and the barge). The
	emissions from the oil end products use would be the same, and do not depend on the
	particular source of oil.
Appendix D	Please fix Tables to be legible, and include assumptions and calculation for the fugitive
	emissions from PRC 421.
Hydrology, Wat	er Resources, and Water Quality
Page 4-174,	Venoco has a RWQCB-approved SWPPP for its Ellwood facility operations. The plan
MM WQ-3b	will be updated to reflect 421 operations, however, there are no new activities being
	introduced that would change the basic components of the plan. Venoco proposes to
	use BMPs during construction work and maintains spill containment and response
	equipment at the EOF.
Marine Biologic	
Page 4-220,	This measure should be amended to read, "Avoid Caisson Repair during Grunion
MM MBIO-1a	Spawning Season (March through September), if feasible." MM MBIO-1b provides for
	mitigation and protection of grunion if caisson work is to occur between March through
	September. There may be other factors that warrant scheduling construction activities
	during this time period.
Page 4-220,	Because of the short-term and localized nature of this impact, it should be
221, Impact	characterized as a Class III impact for which mitigation measures to further reduce the
MBIO-2	potential impacts are applied.
Page 4-232,	The new Bird Island structures do not constitute new habitat for roosting seabirds.
MM MBIO-4b	Rather, they are replacement habitat for an old, structurally unsound, pier remnant that
	was used extensively by brown pelicans and double-crested cormorants for years while
	the 421 piers were operational. Recommissioning the lease does not represent a new
	risk. In addition, the existing Area Contingency Plan and Venoco's Oil Spill Response
	Plan addresses protection of area resources, including seabirds. A special Protection Plan is not warranted.
Page 4-233,	This impact should be reclassified as a Class III impact given the low likelihood of 5
Impact MBIO-5	barge trips/year (maximum) resulting in a collision with a marine mammal or sea turtle,
IIIIpact IVIDIO-3	particularly if training for vessel crews is provided. In all the years of Venoco operating
	the EMT and associated barge loads, no such accidents have occurred.
Page 4-234	The expectations in Part 2 of this mitigation measure need clarification. The barge
MM MBIO-5a	Jovalan carries crude oil not only from Venoco's Ellwood operation, but from other
WWW WIELD OR	sources as well, to San Francisco and Los Angeles area refineries. As written, it is
	unclear at what point during transit the marine mammal observers are required. It is
,	also unclear when, seasonally, such observers are required. We suggest the following
	modification: "A minimum of two marine mammal observers shall be placed onboard all
	at least one barge support vessel while the Jovalan is in transit through the Santa
	Barbara Channel during the spring (April – June) and fall (November – December) gray
	whale migration periods. Observers can include the vessel operator and/or crew
	members, as well as any Project worker that has received proper training."
	gical Resources
Page 4-261,	Mitigation references to boring under drainages identified as having existing or potential
Lines 10-14	habitats for special status biological resources and limiting work to non-flowing seasons
	for such drainages are not applicable to the proposed Project and should be moved to
	the pipeline sub-alternative.
Page 4-265,	These two mitigation measures are unnecessary as most of what is recommended by
MM TBIO-2a	these measures is already covered in the Area Contingency Plans for the Ellwood
and 2b	coastline (i.e., identification of sensitive areas to be avoided/protected, access/egress
	points, low-impact clean-up techniques, etc.), which are updated by the U.S.Coast
	Guard and CDFG Oil Spill Prevention Division. Development of site-specific habitat
	restoration plans would not necessarily be useful or effective in the event of a spill as
	the circumstances of the spill (i.e., quantity spilled, area impacted, etc.) would

Page/Location	Comment	
age/Location	determine the appropriate site-specific restoration measures. Funding for Goleta Park	
	Department and Coal Oil Point Reserve staff for resources and training purposes in the	
	event of a spill is an unnecessary contingency measure. Venoco is happy to consult	
	with these groups during the process of updating the EAP to incorporate SL 421	
	operations. However, these groups are not considered emergency responders and do	
	not need to be staffed up and trained as such.	
Land Use		
	This section should include a legal analysis of Venoco's vested right for returning SL	
	421 to production	
Table 4.8-2,	Several entries in this table suggest that the proposed Project may be inconsistent with	
Goleta Policy	the Goleta GP/CLUP Policies as aspects of the project involve dehydration, "a method	
Analysis; Page	of processing". However, oil/water/gas separation by means of gravity and dehydration	
298, LU-1	are commonly considered production activities, not processing. The Goleta Zoning Ordinance defines oil and gas production as: "Drilling and re-working of oil and/or gas	
Impact Discussion	wells and long-term deployment of associated equipment to extract oil and gas and	
Discussion	associated byproducts in payable quantities from a proven reservoir. Oil and gas	
	production is divided into the following five major activities: Drilling, Extraction,	
	Separation: All activities at the drill site necessary to separate by gravity or pressure	
	the various phases of production. These phases would include water, oil, and natural	
1	gas. Free water knockout represents a typical gravity separation process. Dehydration:	
	All activities necessary to remove water from oil and/or gas by means other than	
	gravity. Such activities may include heater treaters for oil dehydration and moleseives	
	and glycol contactors for gas dehydration. Dehydration does not include wastewater	
	treatment. Transportation" Under this definition, the proposed Project is an oil	
D 1.000	production operation and not a processing operation.	
Page 4-306,	The statement "This Alternative would contribute to extending the life of the EOF" is inaccurate. The life of the EOF is dependent upon the rate of depletion of the South	
Lines 19-20	Ellwood Field, the price of oil, and economics associated with Platform Holly	
	operations. SL 421 oil production is not sufficient to solely support the continued	
,	operation of the EOF. Venoco will cease SL 421 operations prior to or at the time	
	Platform Holly production ceases.	
Transportation and Circulation		
Page 4-336,	MM TR-1a is too restrictive and does not allow for emergencies and special situations.	
Lines 17-23	It should be changed as follows: "To minimize the potential for adverse impacts, the	
	Project should be conditioned to require construction traffic, particularly heavy trucks,	
	during non-emergency trips to avoid congested areas at Storke Road and utilize the	
	Winchester Canyon Overpass to access the site. When combined with scheduling trips outside the peak hour, this measure would ensure that short-term impacts remain less	
·	than significant on transportation and circulation."	
Page 4-336,	MM TR-1b should be changed as follows: "To minimize the potential for adverse	
Lines 24-29	impacts, the Project should be required to repair/upgrade the access road if it receives	
	that may have received-damage or degradation as a result of construction-related	
	traffic. The access road will be inspected and photographed before and after the	
	project, and a determination will be made if it needs repairs. This measure would	
	ensure that short-term impacts would remain less than significant on the access road	
	on roadways."	
Page 4-344,	MM TR-5a is too restrictive and does not allow for emergencies and special situations.	
Lines 19-24	It should be changed as follows: "To minimize the potential for adverse impacts, the	
	Project should be conditioned to require tanker traffic during non-emergency trips to	
	avoid transport of oil during peak hour traffic hours (8:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m., and 4:30	
	p.m. to 5:30 p.m.). This measure would ensure that long-term impacts remain less than significant on transportation and circulation."	
Page 4-344,	MM TR-5b does not allow for emergencies and special situations. It should be changed	
lines 25-30	as follows: "To minimize the potential for adverse impacts, the Project should be	
III 103 20-00	as tollows. To this intige the peteritian for adverse impacts, the Froject should be	

Page/Location	Comment	
	conditioned to require tanker traffic during non-emergency trips to avoid congested	
	areas at Storke Road and utilize the Winchester Canyon Overpass to access the site.	
	When combined with scheduling trips outside the peak hour, this measure would	
	ensure that short-term impacts remain less than significant on transportation and	
Naisa	circulation."	
Noise   Page 4-357,   MM NZ-1b should be worded to match the Goleta Noise and Land Use Compatibility		
MM NZ-1b,	Criteria that identifies noise levels of up to 70 dBA as "Normally acceptable" levels at	
Lines 21-25	golf courses, riding stables, water recreation and cemeteries, as follows: "Contractors	
	should implement appropriate BMPs to avoid impacting the public including but not	
	limited to changing the location of stationary construction equipment, shutting off idling	
	equipment, and installing acoustic barriers around significant sources of stationary	
	construction noise, as practical, that the noise at sensitive receivers such as golf courses, water recreation areas and riding stables, the noise does not exceed 70 dBA	
	CNEL.	
Page 4-357,	MM NZ-1c should be worded to match the Goleta Noise and Land Use Compatibility	
MM NZ-1c,	Criteria that identifies noise levels of up to 70 dBA as "Normally acceptable" levels at	
Lines 26-31	golf courses, riding stables, water recreation and cemeteries, as follows: "To the extent	
	practicable, adequate distance buffers should be maintained between noise-generating	
	machinery or equipment and any sensitive receivers. The buffer should ensure that noise at the receiver site such as a residence does not exceed 65 dBA CNEL, and at	
	receivers such as golf courses, water recreation areas and riding stables, the noise	
	does not exceed 70 dBA CNEL.	
Aesthetic/Visua		
Page 4-274,	The impact description should be modified as follows: Construction activities would	
Impact VR-1	create short-term negative visual impacts." Because of the temporary and localized	
	nature of the impact, it should be considered Class III. The mitigation measures could still be applied to further reduce adverse impacts.	
Public Services	Suil be applied to further reduce adverse impacts.	
Page 4-319,	The DEIR states that the area is under-served by fire protection services. Venoco does	
Impact PS-1,	not argue this statement. However, the DEIR states that recommissioning PRC 421	
Lines 16-28	would contribute to demand for fire inspection and protection services and	
	characterizes this as a Class II impact. Venoco already pays and continues to pay for	
	Fire Department oversight of its Ellwood operations through the Fire Department's participation on the Santa Barbara County System Safety Reliability Review Committee	
	(SSRRC) and Permit Compliance Committee (PCC). The addition of PRC 421 to	
	Venoco's operations would not significantly increase the workload burden of the Fire	
	Dept. This impact should be quantified in some manner to provide adequate	
	justification. The imposition of an Impact Development Fee, if any, should take into	
	account the reimbursement arrangement already in place for Fire Dept. oversight via	
Dogo 4 220	these committees.	
Page 4-320 Impact PS-2,	The DEIR presumes that Venoco would operate PRC 421 without a Fire Prevention Plan. Section 2.4 describes Venoco's existing Fire Prevention & Preparedness Plan for	
Lines 25-27	the existing South Ellwood Field Operations.	
Energy and Mineral Resources		
Page 4-407,	The Impact states that the proposed project would increase the amount of fossil fuel	
Impact EMR-2	consumption of diesel fuel associated with the barge Jovalan by approximately 20,222	
	bbls/yr. However, the impact statement omits the fact that the project would produce an	
	estimated 1.4 million bbls or oil over the lifetime of the project, which is arguably a beneficial (Class IV) impact. Both sides of the issue should be presented.	
Environmental J		
Page 4-416,	The proposed Project does not involve siting new facilities, but rather, making use of	
Impact EJ-1	existing facilities and infrastructure. The potential impacts of a spill at the EMT or from	
•	barging operations is no greater than what exists today. The discussion does not take	

Page/Location	Comment	
·	into consideration the probability of such an event that would reach Devereux Slough. We strongly disagree with the conclusion that the proposed Project would result in a Class I impact to minority or low-income populations. Further, the EMT lease renewal EIR does not identify any Environmental Justice impacts from barge spills, and that analysis was performed for the full permitted capacity of the facilities. The proposed PRC-421 project is much smaller in scope; it only has a potential to increase barge trips by 5 in the "worst-case" year, and thus would have no Environmental Justice impacts. The EMT EIR does not identify any significant unmitigable safety impacts (only environmental that have impacts on biology and water quality).  Thus, impact EJ-1 should be deleted.	
Significant Environmental Effects that cannot be Mitigated to Less Than Significant		
Page 5-1, Lines 18-19	The following statement should be revised or stricken: "The proposed Project would allow continued barging of crude oil from the EMT up to the permitted limits." This appears to be a carry-over from the EMT DEIR. The proposed Project would have no effect on the authorizations granted for EMT operations.	
Page 5-1, Line 25	Please correct this sentence to read: "This increase in loading operations would increase the frequency probability of spills to the environmental over the current operations."	
Significant Environmental Effects of the Proposed Project that would be Irreversible		
Page 5-2, Line 23 and Page 5- 3, Lines 5-9	The statement that the project would "continue the trend of reliance on non-renewable fossil fuel consumption with the project's contribution to associated local and larger scaleimpacts such as global warming" is, at best, speculative, and at worst, simply false. The proposed Project would have no influence over end-consumers' reliance on or resistance to fossil fuel consumption. The contribution of oil production from PRC 421 is minor in the global scheme or even in the CA marketplace It would, however, decrease ever so slightly the need for imported oil from foreign or AK sources to meet the demands of CA refineries, and in so doing, reduce greenhouse gas emissions and global warming.	
Growth-Inducing Impacts of the Proposed Project		
Page 5-4, Line 8	The word "baseline" should be removed from this sentence as baseline conditions are in dispute and returning 421 to service would result in the re-introduction of 421 oil to the EMT and barging operation as it occurred prior to 1994.	
Page 5-4, Line 20	Please correct. The piers at PRC 421 are a legal <i>conforming</i> use, not legal <i>non-conforming</i> use, as stated.	
Page 5-4, Lines 25-28	The statement that "approval of offshore separation-processing could contribute to pressure to partially remove or reverse long-standing local policy initiatives to eliminate offshore "processing" of oil in favor of the use of consolidate[d] onshore facilities" is inaccurate and should be removed. The proposed equipment and operations involve oil, water, and gas separation, which clearly falls under the definition of oil "production", as, defined by the City of Goleta and County of Santa Barbara. Processing is not proposed.	
Mitigation Monit		
Section 6.0	The above comments on impact discussions and mitigation measures should also be reflected in the revised Mitigation Monitoring Program Tables.	
Appendix H		
Appendix H Page 1 and 2	Incorporation of all the mitigation measures from the EMT Lease Extension EIR into the Proposed project DEIR is inappropriate as: (1) the EMT EIR has not been finalized or certified; (2) the two projects have significantly different scopes; and (3) the mitigation measures do not apply to the proposed project.	